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Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards and the Market for 
New Vehicles 
Thomas Klier and Joshua Linn 
Abstract 
This paper presents an overview of the economics literature on the effect of Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards on the new vehicle market. Since 1978, CAFE has imposed fuel 
economy standards for cars and light trucks sold in the U.S. market. This paper reviews the history of the 
standards, followed by a discussion of the major upcoming changes in implementation and stringency. It 
describes strategies that firms can use to meet the standards and reviews the CAFE literature as it applies 
to the new vehicle market. The paper concludes by highlighting areas for future research in light of the 
upcoming changes to CAFE. 
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Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards and the Market for 
New Vehicles 
Thomas Klier and Joshua Linn 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. Congress first enacted Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 
1975, following the 1973–1974 oil crisis. During this time, many leaders viewed the passenger 
vehicle sector as key to reducing the country’s dependence on oil imports. The CAFE standards 
were created to achieve this objective by requiring new passenger vehicles sold in the United 
States by major automakers to reach specified minimum levels of fuel economy. Different 
standards applied to cars and light trucks. Figure 1 shows the trajectory of CAFE standards from 
1978 to 2016.1 After an initial phase-in period that ended in the mid-1980s, both standards 
remained essentially constant for nearly two decades. The standards caused fuel economy to 
roughly double between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s (not shown). Since then, the actual (sales-
weighted) fuel economy of vehicles sold has trended down because of the increasing market 
share of light trucks and they fact that they are subject to a lower standard. 
More than 30 years after their introduction, CAFE standards changed in 2007 and again 
in 2009. In 2007 they increased substantially, with legislation stipulating that over a nine-year 
period beginning in 2011, the standards for cars and light trucks were to increase by about 40 
percent. In 2009, the Obama administration moved up the timeline for compliance from 2020 to 
2016. 
The implementation of CAFE also has changed, in two important ways. First, when a 
firm generates credits from overcomplying with the standards, it can trade the credits across the 
car and light truck segments, and it can trade with other firms. Second, instead of averaging fuel 
economy across vehicles sold within the car and light truck segments, a manufacturer will have 
to meet standards based on the footprint of each of its vehicles (defined by the rectangle created 
by its four wheels). 
                                                 
 Thomas Klier, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, thomas.klier@chi.frb.org; Joshua Linn (corresponding author), 
Resources for the Future, linn@rff.org.  
1 Fuel economy of light trucks was not regulated until model year 1978, and the standard was less stringent than the 
one for cars (McCarthy 2007). See Section 2.1 for further discussion of the history of CAFE. Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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Coinciding with these changes has been great public interest in understanding the costs 
and effectiveness of using CAFE to reduce oil imports and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
particularly as compared to other policy tools, such as an increase in the gasoline tax or 
subsidizing the production and purchase of new vehicle technologies. Among regulatory policies 
for reducing gasoline consumption, CAFE represents a so-called command-and-control 
regulation. Alternatively, market-based forms of regulations, such as taxes, work via price 
signals (see, for example, Crandall 1992; Portney et al. 2003; Harrington and Morgenstern 
2004).  
Quantifying the costs and effectiveness of alternative policies for raising fuel economy is 
far from straightforward, and a full comparison requires consideration of three components. 
First, CAFE directly affects the new vehicle market, a market that is highly complex. A number 
of large firms produce many different vehicles and choose a large set of physical characteristics 
as well as the price of each vehicle. These features of the market present major challenges to 
assessing the cost of a particular technical standard to new vehicle consumers and producers. 
Second, fuel economy standards for new vehicles affect the used vehicle markets. 
Changes in physical characteristics and prices of new vehicles affect consumers’ decisions on 
when to retire or trade in their currently owned vehicles. Furthermore, by affecting vehicles sold 
in the new vehicle market, CAFE affects vehicles subsequently supplied in the used vehicle 
market. 
Third, it is necessary to link changes in the new and used vehicle markets to the gasoline 
market. An increase in the CAFE standards raises the fuel economy of the fleet of vehicles in use 
through changes in the characteristics of new vehicles sold, but the relationship between fleet 
fuel economy and gasoline consumption is not one for one. An increase in fuel economy reduces 
the per-mile cost of driving, which may cause people to drive more and partially offset the 
increase in fuel economy—the rebound effect. Furthermore, CAFE affects the fleet of vehicles in 
use gradually over time, whereas many other policies, such as an increase in the gasoline tax, 
have more immediate effects. In short, comparing the costs and effectiveness of CAFE with 
those of other policies requires an analysis of many markets, firms, and consumers. 
This review article discusses the literature on CAFE in the context of the major recent 
changes to the standards: the increases in the standards and the change to the footprint-based 
approach. It focuses on the first component of policy evaluation, the new vehicles market. In 
particular, it looks at an aspect of CAFE that has only lately received attention among 
economists—the effect of the regulation on firms’ behavior in the new vehicles market. The Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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economic models used to analyze the CAFE standards have grown increasingly sophisticated in 
an attempt to characterize many options available to firms, as well as consumer demand over 
vehicle characteristics and prices. One major implication of the new literature is that the cost of 
the CAFE standards to new vehicle producers and consumers may be substantially lower than 
earlier analyses found. Although a number of recent studies have investigated the new vehicle 
market in increasing detail, we suggest that the upcoming changes to CAFE raise a number of 
questions for future research on consumer and producer behavior in the new vehicle market.  
Although this paper focuses on the new vehicles market, we note the treatment in the 
literature of the other two components of policy evaluation as well. Only a few CAFE studies 
have closely examined interactions between the new and used vehicle markets. Several empirical 
studies have estimated the magnitude of the rebound effect and have found that it offsets 10–20 
percent of the reduction in fuel consumption that would otherwise occur under tighter standards 
(Jones 1993; Greene et al. 1999; Small and van Dender, 2007). For a more complete welfare 
discussion and comparison of CAFE with alternative policies, see Anderson et al. (2010); this 
review article discusses many of the same studies but with a greater focus on the analysis of the 
new vehicles market.  
Finally, a number of other countries have programs similar to CAFE, but these have not 
been studied nearly as much as CAFE and are not considered in this paper. Many European and 
Asian countries use vehicle and purchase taxes, as well as fuel economy regulation, to reduce 
gasoline consumption. By comparison, in the United States, gasoline taxes are considered as a 
way to raise funds for highway construction and infrastructure maintenance. All three increases 
to the federal gasoline tax since 1973 were justified as a way to reduce the deficit or improve 
infrastructure (Sullivan 2008). 
The paper proceeds with a review of the CAFE standards, including a discussion of the 
causes of the recent changes. Section 3 discusses the options available to firms to increase their 
fuel economy and presents a basic static model of the new vehicle market. We discuss the three 
prominent features of the market in the recent literature—imperfect competition, technological 
options for manufacturers, and consumer demand over vehicle price and physical characteristics. 
Section 4 discusses the contributions of the recent literature to characterizing all three features in 
a more realistic manner than did previous studies. Finally, Section 5 discusses potential areas of 
future research on CAFE and the new vehicles market in light of the new regime.  Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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2. History of CAFE 
2.1 CAFE I 
Following the 1973 oil crisis, the U.S. Congress passed the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act in 1975 with the intent of reducing oil imports. The act established the first-
ever fuel economy regulations, which we refer to as CAFE I, for passenger vehicles in the United 
States. The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA), which is part of the 
Department of Transportation, administers the fuel economy requirements and sets standards for 
other vehicle classes, such as light trucks (which include minivans, sport utility vehicles, and 
pickup trucks). Standards for cars and light trucks have been separate, and the light truck 
standards always have been lower than the ones for cars.2 Beginning in model year (MY) 1978, 
CAFE I required automobile manufacturers to increase the average fuel economy of cars sold in 
the United States from 18 miles per gallon (mpg) to 27.5 mpg by MY 1985.3 NHTSA set fuel 
economy standards for light trucks starting in MY 1979 at 17.2 mpg. Both fuel economy 
standards rose quickly after they were introduced. Then, between the mid-1980s and the 2000s, 
the standards were unchanged. The light truck standards increased gradually in the 2000s, and in 
MY 2009 the standards were 27.5 mpg for cars and 23.1 mpg for light trucks.4  
CAFE standards are administered on the basis of EPA’s test procedure for measuring fuel 
economy of new vehicles.5 Firms may also earn credits for over compliance that they can use in 
future years. Compliance with the standards is measured by calculating a harmonic sales-
                                                 
2 See McCarthy (2007, 243) on the politics behind the lower standards for light trucks. 
3 The secretary of transportation has the discretion to adjust the passenger car standard within a range of 26–27.5 
mpg. A decrease in the car standard to 26 mpg for the years 1986–1988 represents a temporary exemption that the 
secretary granted due to hardship concerns that General Motors and Ford raised at the time. (See Yacobucci and 
Bamberger 2006, 2.) A decrease in the light truck standard in 1980 occurred because trucks above 6,000 pounds 
were included in the standard for the first time that year. 
4 NHTSA has broad authority to establish the structure and targets for light trucks but not cars. NHTSA used that 
authority to establish light truck CAFE standards for MY 2005 to MY 2007 as well as modify the structure of the 
program for MY 2008 to MY 2011, which included the introduction of the attribute-based standard (Yacobucci and 
Bamberger 2006). 
5 NHTSA regulates CAFE standards, and the EPA measures vehicle fuel economy of each vehicle sold in the United 
States at its Ann Arbor, Michigan, facility. However, the fuel economy data used for compliance with CAFE do not 
match the fuel economy data shown on new car window stickers. The EPA has adjusted the methodology used to 
produce the consumer-relevant mpg data over the years to better reflect actual driving conditions. A car that 
achieves 35 mpg for CAFE will likely have a window sticker that has a combined (city and highway) rating of 
between 26 and 27 mpg (Abuelsamid 2010). Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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weighted average of the fuel economies of each manufacturer’s product line.6 The penalty for 
non-compliance was initially $5 for every 0.1 mpg below the standards, multiplied by the 
number of cars in the manufacturer’s new car fleet that year (the penalty was increased to $5.50 
in 1997). Between 1983 and 2002, total civil penalties were slightly more than $600 million, 
which mostly small and specialty European manufacturers paid (Yacobucci and Bamberger 
2006). 
CAFE I had a large effect on the design of the American car and light truck. Figure 2 
shows that cars became smaller, lighter, and powered by smaller engines.7 In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, weight and power decreased significantly as fuel economy improved. Thereafter, 
fuel economy remained constant while weight and power increased so that by the late 1980s, 
power had returned to its pre–oil-crisis level; power and weight continued to rise in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Similarly large changes have occurred for light trucks (not shown). Klier and Linn 
(2010) suggest that this pattern reflects an important initial compliance strategy for CAFE I of 
raising fuel economy by reducing weight and power. DeCicco (2007) and Knittel (2009) argue 
that nearly all the improvements to vehicle technology since that time have been used to increase 
power and weight without sacrificing fuel economy—that is, to maintain fuel economy at the 
levels of the standards. 
While Figure 2 shows the overall compliance of the industry, Figure 3 shows that firms 
have taken different approaches regarding the level of compliance. Panel A separates the three 
U.S. automakers and shows that the fuel economy of their cars is quite similar to one another and 
the CAFE standard, particularly before the late 1990s. Panel B shows that the average fuel 
economy of cars sold in the United States by U.S. automakers was significantly lower than that 
of Honda and Toyota. The patterns for light trucks are generally similar (but not shown). Thus, 
                                                 
6 Manufacturers had to meet standards separately for their domestically produced cars and for their imported cars. A 
passenger car was considered “domestic” if at least 75 percent of its content was of either United States or Canadian 
origin. For light trucks, the distinction between domestics and imports was in effect only from MY 1980 to MY 
1996 (NHTSA 2010). 
7 McCarthy (2007) notes that the 1970s oil price shocks and the CAFE program caused a number of changes to 
vehicle characteristics and technology. First, automakers eliminated about a foot of overhang, representing around 
700 pounds of weight, from vehicles. Second, four- and six-cylinder engines replaced the V8-engine, which 
powered 76 percent of the American cars sold in the United States in 1977. Third, introducing front-wheel drive and 
mounting the engine cross-wise allowed automakers to reduce size and maintain cabin space by removing the hump 
that ran down the car’s center. Finally, automakers replaced carburetors with electronic fuel injection systems, 
which significantly increased fuel efficiency. Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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historically, the U.S. automakers have just met the car standard each year, whereas Honda and 
Toyota have consistently exceeded it. Although it is not shown in the figure, other firms have 
taken yet a different approach. For example, BMW and Mercedes Benz have been consistently 
below the car standard and have paid the applicable fines.   
2.2 CAFE II 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 established stricter fuel economy 
standards, which we refer to as CAFE II. They begin phasing in with MY 2011, and ultimately 
require a combined average fuel economy of 35 mpg. The initial law required automakers to 
meet this level by MY 2020, but in the spring of 2009, the Obama administration changed the 
compliance date to MY 2016 (see Figure 1).8 
CAFE II for the first time regulates GHGs emitted by motor vehicles, a task that EPA is 
authorized to oversee. As a result, EPA and the Department of Transportation jointly have set the 
new CAFE standards. The basis for EPA’s involvement is an “endangerment finding” the agency 
issued in December 2009, which emanated from a Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA. This finding states that GHG emissions from automobiles negatively affect public health 
and welfare: light vehicles emit 65 percent of all transportation sector GHGs, and the sector as a 
whole accounts for 28 percent of all U.S. GHG emissions (Yacobucci 2010). 
In addition to significantly increasing the standards, CAFE II implements two changes. 
First, it introduces fuel economy standards based on the vehicle’s footprint. Figure 4 plots the 
mpg standard for cars in 2016 as a function of the footprint. (Light trucks have a similar pattern 
to cars.) For reference, the footprint of the Toyota Prius is about 45 square feet. The figure shows 
that smaller cars have a significantly higher standard. The fuel economy standard for each 
automaker’s cars and trucks is equal to the sales-weighted mean of the standard for each vehicle. 
For example, an automaker that primarily sells small cars would have a higher standard than an 
automaker that sells large cars. As a practical matter, the attribute-based standards will have 
different effects on different manufacturers, depending on the size mix of the vehicles they sell 
and how costly it will be to raise fuel economy for different sized vehicles.  
                                                 
8 The final rule for CAFE became effective in May 2010. It requires the target fleet fuel economy by 2016 to be 34.1 
mpg. That number is less than 35 because some reductions of GHG emissions, such as making a vehicle’s air 
conditioning system more efficient, affect the vehicle’s fuel economy. If all GHG reductions would result from fuel 
economy improvements, the “GHG-equivalent” mileage requirement would be 35.5 mpg (Yacobucci 2010). Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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The stated objective of the move to these attribute-based standards is to prevent “vehicle 
downsizing.” The previous CAFE structure, in which all cars were held to one standard and all 
light trucks to another, allowed vehicle manufacturers to comply by shifting their product sales 
from larger to smaller vehicles within the car and light truck segments.9 Such changes would not 
necessarily help the firm comply with CAFE II because smaller vehicles are subject to a higher 
standard. Because many car models are located in the downward sloping section of Figure 4, 
shifting sales toward smaller cars would raise a firm’s CAFE standard and may not help it 
achieve compliance. 
The concern over vehicle downsizing arose from the literature on vehicle safety and 
CAFE. Safety is an important aspect to consider when assessing CAFE’s full welfare effects 
(see, for example, Crandall and Graham 1989; Portney et al. 2003). The existing literature has 
suggested that CAFE could have a quantitatively large effect on vehicle passenger safety because 
smaller vehicles are less safe in single-vehicle accidents, and larger vehicles pose a hazard to 
smaller vehicles in multiple-vehicle accidents (Gayer 2004). Jacobsen (2010b) finds that CAFE I 
caused about 150 fatalities per year. He estimates that CAFE II would have a much smaller 
effect than CAFE I on safety because of the reduction in vehicle downsizing.  
The second change to the structure of CAFE is that manufacturers can trade the credits 
they generate by overcomplying with the standard across a firm’s car and light truck fleets as 
well as with other firms. The motivation for allowing credit trading is to reduce the overall cost 
of the regulation. Introducing credit trading may also affect safety. Li (forthcoming) estimates 
that 12 percent of the light trucks sold in 2006 were due to the “arms race,” in which consumers 
purchased light trucks because of safety concerns. By decreasing the safety of smaller vehicles, 
light trucks imposed an externality of roughly $2,000 per vehicle (insurance policies may only 
partially internalize this effect). It is widely believed that CAFE I caused firms to increase sales 
of light trucks at the expense of cars. Credit trading could reduce this practice and reduce the 
extent of this so-called arms race. 
                                                 
9 In addition, there was an incentive to modify cars with low fuel economy so that they would be classified as light 
trucks and therefore subject to the lower standard. Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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3. The New Vehicle Market and the Economics of CAFE 
3.1 Technical Trade-Offs 
Because CAFE standards are sales-weighted average values of fuel economy, a firm can 
meet higher standards in several ways. First, a firm can change its sales mix by reducing the 
relative prices of vehicles with high fuel economy. Such price changes would raise the sales-
weighted average fuel economy of the firm’s vehicles. 
In addition, a firm can change a particular vehicle model’s characteristics to increase its 
fuel economy in the following three ways: 
a)  reduce the power; 
b)  redesign the engine or transmission to increase fuel economy without reducing power; and 
c)  reduce the weight. 
Examples of reducing power include retuning the engine or offering a smaller engine. In 
contrast, a number of technologies—used jointly or alone—can raise fuel economy by a few 
percentage points each. For example, introducing variable valve timing or increasing the number 
of transmission speeds raises fuel economy. Finally, using lightweight materials or removing 
components decreases weight and therefore improves fuel economy. 
Each option includes trade-offs. Reducing horsepower may raise fuel economy but also 
reduces the performance (for example, the acceleration) of the vehicle. The change in profits 
from this option depends on consumers’ relative demand for fuel economy and performance. 
Increasing fuel economy by redesigning the engine or transmission raises the cost of producing 
the vehicle. Reducing the weight of the vehicle also is costly, in terms of either greater 
production costs from using lightweight materials or a decrease in consumer demand due to the 
removal of components the consumer finds valuable. 
It is also important to distinguish the time horizon over which vehicle producers can 
implement changes. In the new vehicles market, the timing of firms’ major decisions dictates the 
short, medium, and long run. Firms typically choose vehicle prices once each year, although 
firms also can offer price incentives during the year (the short run. Changes in vehicle 
characteristics typically occur every four to five years during major model redesigns (the 
medium run). Engine technologies change more slowly, as engines are redesigned roughly every 
10 years (the long run).  
Note that to improve fuel economy, a firm can change vehicle characteristics in two ways 
in the medium run. First, the firm can reduce vehicle weight or power. Second, the firm can Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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modify the power train in a way that does not require the firm to redesign the engine or 
transmission. For example, changing from a five-speed to a six-speed transmission would 
increase fuel economy but would not require redesigning the transmission. Power trains are 
intentionally designed with this flexibility, allowing firms to respond to cost or demand shocks 
without having to redesign the power train.  
By comparison, long-run changes include redesigning the power train—for example, by 
introducing hybrid technology. Compared to long-run changes, the medium-run changes are 
simple to implement and generally cost less, but result in smaller fuel economy gains. Referring 
to the list above of changes in characteristics that increase fuel economy, (a) and (c) are possible 
in the medium run, and (b) includes both medium-run and long-run changes. Thus, following an 
unexpected increase in the CAFE standards, firms may adjust prices in the short run; they may 
change weight, power, and modify the power train to improve fuel economy in the medium run; 
and they may change the power train technology in the long run. 
3.2 New Vehicle Market—A Simple Model 
To provide a framework for comparing the literature on CAFE and new vehicle markets, 
this section presents a static model of the new vehicle market. CAFE imposes a constraint on 
firms, requiring that the average fuel economy of their vehicles exceed a particular level. The 
model is used to derive first order conditions to the firm’s profit maximization problem that 
demonstrate the incentives CAFE creates for changing vehicle prices and fuel economy. 
The model has one time period, and the market containsJ vehicles, indexed J j ... 1  . 
Consumer demand for each vehicle depends on the price ( j p ) and fuel economy ( j m ) of the 
vehicle according to the function ) , ( j j j m p q q  . The demand function includes the following 
assumptions: a) cross-price elasticities equal zero; b) the functional form is the same for each 
vehicle; and c) vehicles are differentiated only by their fuel economy. These assumptions 
simplify the present discussion, but the conclusions are robust to relaxing them (see Jacobsen 
2010a; Klier and Linn 2010). 
Each firm, indexed  N i ... 1  , sells a subset i J of the vehicles in the market. The 
economics literature includes two broad categories of studies, depending on whether the firm 
chooses fuel economy. We assume first that fuel economy is exogenously determined for each 
vehicle in the market. Firms maximize profits by choosing vehicle prices, taking as exogenous 
the fuel economy of each vehicle, consumer demand, and the CAFE constraint. Each firm is 
subject to the CAFE constraint that the average fuel economy of its vehicles must meet a Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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particular threshold,C . For simplicity, we assume that the same standard applies to all the 
vehicles in the market and that there is no credit trading across firms. The firm’s profit 
maximization problem is given by:  
 
] , [ ) ( max
} { j j
J j





C m p q m m p q t s
i i J j
j j j
J j
j j / ] , [ / ] , [ . .  
 
  
where j c is the marginal cost of producing the vehicle.10  
Because there are no cross-price elasticities, the price chosen for one vehicle does not 
affect demand for other vehicles. This greatly simplifies the discussion; note that the literature 
often assumes that firms compete in a Bertrand-Nash manner, in which they choose prices of the 
vehicles they sell and take the prices of other firms as given. By comparison, in the simple case 
here, the firm’s pricing decisions are that of a multiproduct monopolist, where the CAFE 
constraint links pricing decisions across a firm’s vehicles. For example, changing the price of 
one vehicle affects profits from another vehicle because the price of the other vehicle may have 





















where j  is the own-price elasticity of demand for vehicle j and is the multiplier on the 
constraint. The first two terms in the first-order condition are the standard terms for a profit-
maximizing, single-product monopolist. To see the effect of CAFE on vehicle prices, suppose 
first that the constraint does not bind ( 0   ). The markup (the percentage by which the price 
                                                 
10 The constraint is commonly expressed as: C
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. The constraint has been rearranged to simplify 
the first order conditions. 
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exceeds the marginal cost) is inversely proportional to the negative of the own price elasticity of 
demand. Thus, the markup is greater for vehicles with more inelastic demand. 
The final term in the first-order condition shows the effect of the CAFE constraint on 
vehicle prices. When the constraint binds ( 0   ), the firm reduces the price below the 
unconstrained vehicle price for vehicles with fuel economy greater thanC . The firm raises the 
price above the unconstrained price for vehicles with fuel economy less thanC . In other words, 
the firm adjusts the relative prices of its vehicles to encourage consumers to purchase more of the 
vehicles with high fuel economy and fewer of the vehicles with low fuel economy.  
The first-order condition shows that the standard affects prices in a similar manner to a 
“feebate” program. Under a feebate program, the regulator chooses a target level of fuel 
economy. A purchaser of a new vehicle pays a fee for a vehicle with fuel economy below the 
target and receives a rebate for a vehicle with fuel economy above the target. By subsidizing 
vehicles with high fuel economy and taxing vehicles with low fuel economy, the feebate 
program shifts sales toward vehicles with high fuel economy and away from vehicles with low 
fuel economy. Although the market equilibrium may be different under the CAFE standards, 
CAFE and a feebate program thus push prices and quantities in the same directions. 
Next, we consider the case in which the firm chooses the fuel economy of each vehicle at 
the same time as it chooses the price. In this case, raising fuel economy also raises the marginal 
cost of the vehicle, so that ) ( j j m c c  , with 0 ' c . The first-order condition for vehicle price is 



































c p   
Similarly to the case with exogenous fuel economy, first suppose that the CAFE 
constraint does not bind. The firm equates the marginal cost and marginal benefit of increasing 
fuel economy. The first term shows the effect on demand of increasing fuel economy; profits 
increase in proportion to the difference between the vehicle price and marginal costs as well as in 
proportion to the effect of fuel economy on demand. The second term shows that increasing fuel 
economy also raises costs.  
The final term shows that the effect of CAFE on fuel economy for each vehicle is 
ambiguous and depends on the functional forms. When the constraint binds, for vehicles with 
fuel economy greater thanC , the left-hand side of the first-order condition would be positive at 
the level of fuel economy and prices chosen in the preceding paragraph, in which the CAFE Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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constraint did not bind. Under certain conditions, imposing CAFE could cause fuel economy of a 
firm’s vehicles to diverge; the firm will increase the fuel economy of vehicles that initially have 
high fuel economy and decrease the fuel economy of vehicles that have low fuel economy. 
Under different conditions, imposing CAFE could cause firms to increase fuel economy of all 
vehicles. 
Thus, the simple model demonstrates the effect of CAFE on vehicle prices and suggests 
that in general, the effect of CAFE on fuel economy is ambiguous. Allowing for endogenous fuel 
economy implies that the cost of CAFE to firms would be lower than if fuel economy is 
exogenous. However, that does not have to be the case for all firms in a more general model, 
particularly accounting for heterogeneity across firms. For example, suppose there are two sets 
of firms, domestic and foreign, and cross-price demand elasticities are positive. In the initial 
equilibrium, with a CAFE constraint, average fuel economy of domestic firms’ vehicles exactly 
equals the constraint, and average fuel economy of foreign firms’ vehicles exceeds the 
constraint. Suppose further that if fuel economy is exogenous, an increase in the standard would 
cause domestic firms to adjust vehicle prices to meet the new standard. This could cause 
consumers to substitute to foreign-made vehicles and increase their profits. By comparison, if 
domestic firms are able to increase the fuel economy of each vehicle when the CAFE standard 
increases, fewer consumers would substitute to foreign firms’ vehicles, and foreign firms’ profits 
would be lower than in the case where fuel economy is exogenous. 
It is necessary to specify the demand function to estimate the cost of CAFE. Some studies 
of new vehicle markets use a random coefficients logit model, while many others use a nested 
logit model. See Berry (1994) for a general discussion of the trade-offs of using these models.  
While a simple model like ours can illustrate some of the effects of CAFE on market 
equilibrium, it does omit a few important features of the market and the upcoming CAFE 
standard. First, firms may raise fuel economy by changing other vehicle characteristics, for 
example, by reducing weight or power. As noted above, such changes typically require an 
increase in production costs or a reduction in the characteristics that consumers positively value. 
Such margins need to be incorporated in an analysis of CAFE II. 
Second, the model includes neither footprint-based standards nor credit trading. It 
assumes a single standard for all vehicles, but in practice a separate standard would apply for 
each vehicle size. According to EPA and NHTSA, one objective of using the footprint-based 
standards is to prevent the type of changes in the sales mix described above. The extent to which 
this objective will be met depends on the relative costs of raising fuel economy, the demand Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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functions, and the trade-offs involved with changing other vehicle characteristics. The next 
section discusses how the literature has addressed these issues. 
4. Effect of CAFE on the New Vehicle Market 
The literature review in this section is organized by the treatment of fuel economy in the 
new vehicle market model. We first discuss papers that treat vehicle characteristics as 
exogenous, then papers that treat them as endogenous, and, finally, papers that specifically focus 
on CAFE II.  
A common structural approach taken in the literature is to begin with a new vehicle 
market model that is similar to the one presented in section 3.2 but that relaxes many of the 
assumptions. These papers estimate demand and supply parameters, and generate welfare 
estimates by simulating the new equilibrium under an increase in the standards. 
4.1 Exogenous Vehicle Characteristics 
A number of papers treat vehicle characteristics as exogenous in estimating the cost of 
CAFE. Greene (1991) estimates the cost to firms of raising fuel economy by changing prices. 
The paper assumes that all costs fall on producers, and demand follows a multinomial logit 
structure. Greene finds that a 1 mpg increase in fuel economy costs $100–200 per vehicle for 
U.S. manufacturers (1985 dollars). This is somewhat higher than the level of the CAFE fine, 
which suggests that adjusting vehicle prices is an expensive means of complying with the 
standards. Although that result was obtained under a number of strong assumptions, numerous 
subsequent studies have confirmed it. 
Goldberg (1998) and Jacobsen (2010a) take broadly similar approaches to comparing 
CAFE with the gasoline tax. Both studies use a joint discrete vehicle choice and continuous 
vehicle usage model, in which products are defined by market segment and manufacturer. 
Goldberg adopts a nested logit structure and further allows for heterogeneous preferences across 
households by including interactions between vehicle characteristics and household 
demographics in the estimation. The supply side is modeled as an oligopoly in which firms 
choose vehicle prices and import shares; marginal costs are recovered from the first-order 
conditions. Goldberg compares the effect on gasoline consumption of CAFE with the gasoline 
tax. Using 1989 as the base year, eliminating CAFE would increase gasoline consumption by 
about 19 million gallons, which would be offset by an increase in the gasoline tax of $0.80 per 
gallon. Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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Jacobsen (2010a) extends the analysis in several ways.11 First, the paper allows for the 
fact that CAFE constrains some firms, whereas others have historically exceeded the standards, 
and a few have paid the fine. This complicates the estimation of marginal costs, which are 
estimated from markups and demand elasticities. Second, following Bento et al. (2009), the 
paper models vehicle choice and usage simultaneously rather than estimating these decisions 
separately. This approach allows for consistent welfare estimates in vehicle and gasoline 
markets. Third, the paper integrates the new and used vehicle markets, which allows for a more 
complete welfare analysis. The paper compares the effects of raising CAFE with increasing the 
price of gasoline. The results suggest that CAFE is several times more costly than the gasoline 
tax, and costs about $20 billion per year. The paper also finds that allowing for consumer 
heterogeneity and the presence of used vehicle markets has important implications for 
distributional impacts across firms and income groups. 
4.2 Endogenous Vehicle Characteristics 
Several recent papers include endogenous vehicle characteristics. When fuel economy is 
exogenous, vehicle price elasticities are the main parameters that need to be estimated on the 
demand side of the market. With endogenous fuel economy, the cost of increasing fuel economy 
and consumer demand for fuel economy become particularly important. Some studies assume 
that consumers treat discounted fuel savings equivalently to the vehicle price, other studies take 
estimates from the empirical literature on consumer demand for fuel economy, and a third group 
of studies directly estimates consumer demand. Most studies use engineering-based estimates of 
the relationship between production costs and fuel economy, and make some allowance for the 
fact that these estimates, when combined with estimated demand for fuel economy, imply that 
firms could increase profits by raising fuel economy. 
Kleit (2004) and Austin and Dinan (2005) compare the cost-effectiveness of the gasoline 
tax and CAFE. On the demand side of the market, the authors obtain price elasticities from a 
survey of vehicle buyers undertaken by a large automaker. Both studies aggregate vehicle 
models to the level of market segment by manufacturer. Firms can increase fuel economy, and 
Kleit assumes the market is competitive, whereas Austin and Dinan model the market as an 
                                                 
11  In addition to the extensions we discuss, the paper also estimates the welfare effects of CAFE allowing for 
endogenous fuel economy improvements. It does so in a manner that is similar to that in Austin and Dinan’s (2005) 
paper, which we discuss below. Also, note that Jacobsen uses a random coefficients model instead of a nested logit 
model. Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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oligopoly. Also, Austin and Dinan use different assumptions for evaluating the gasoline tax. 
Kleit estimates the cost of a 3-mpg increase in the CAFE standards to be $2 billion per year, 
which is 14 times greater than the estimated cost of the gasoline tax. In contrast, Austin and 
Dinan estimate the cost of raising CAFE by 3.8 mpg to be about $3.6 billion, and roughly three 
times higher than the cost of raising the gasoline tax. 
Shiau et al. (2009) analyze a differentiated product market in which firms choose prices 
and the vehicle design. Design choice includes engine size and technology implementation (for 
example, a six-cylinder engine with cylinder deactivation). The paper uses a simulation model to 
estimate vehicle production costs in terms of vehicle design characteristics. Demand is assumed 
to follow a random coefficients logit specification. With these inputs, the paper analyzes the 
effect of the CAFE standards on vehicle design. The authors find that at its present level, the 
CAFE constraint is not binding for a representative firm. Higher standards, however, would 
generate fuel economy improvements. Much higher standards would cause the firms to pay fines, 
unless the fines are also increased.  
Gramlich (2010) does not directly assess the effects of CAFE on new vehicle markets but 
does use a model with endogenous fuel economy. The paper investigates the effect of gas prices 
on fuel economy, where firms trade off fuel economy against vehicle quality. Firms move along 
a technological possibility frontier when the gasoline price changes and select higher fuel 
economy and lower quality when the gasoline price is high. Gramlich estimates consumer 
demand for fuel economy, and accounts for endogenous quality by exploiting the fact that firms 
choose fuel economy before prices. The paper reports a strong consumer demand for fuel 
economy and concludes that a gasoline price of $4.55 per gallon would result in the same fuel 
economy level as CAFE II. 
Klier and Linn (2010) expand the set of margins that firms can use to increase fuel 
economy and model firms’ choices of vehicle performance, weight, and fuel economy. The 
analysis allows for trade-offs between power, weight, and fuel economy, as well as changes to 
power train technology that increase fuel economy while leaving other characteristics 
unchanged. Demand follows a nested logit structure, where consumers choose among models 
within each market segment. The paper estimates that consumers have a larger willingness to pay 
for power than fuel economy while accounting for the fact that firms choose these vehicle 
characteristics. The estimated costs of CAFE are significantly lower when allowing for the firms’ 
choice of fuel economy. Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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Anderson and Sallee (forthcoming) take a much different approach to estimate the cost of 
CAFE. The sale of a flex-fuel vehicle (which is capable of using ethanol) generates additional 
CAFE credits, and the cost of offering flex fuel is typically about $100–200 per vehicle. They 
observe that under four conditions, firms equate this cost with the cost of other compliance 
margins. In that case, the flex fuel cost can be used to estimate the marginal cost of CAFE. They 
demonstrate that the four conditions hold: 1) domestic firms are constrained, and they use the 
flex fuel credits to achieve compliance; 2) flex fuel technology is installed on some but not all 
vehicles; 3) firms rarely exceed the credit limit allowed by law; and 4) consumers do not value 
the flex fuel characteristic. The authors find that the estimated cost is much lower than other 
studies, which do not incorporate this (or many other) margins available to firms and rely on 
strong assumptions regarding market structure; note that these are the estimated costs to 
producers, whereas the costs reported above are the total costs to producers and consumers. 
Table 1 summarizes the key features of these studies. Overall, the literature has found 
CAFE to be significantly more costly per gallon of gasoline saved than a gasoline tax. Although 
direct quantitative comparisons across studies are difficult, estimates of the cost of CAFE tend to 
be lower when analyses include more margins of firms’ decisions. It is also difficult to compare 
consumer demand estimates—price elasticities of demand or consumer demand for fuel 
economy—because the various studies use different demand models and different types of data 
sets (i.e., individual- or market-level data). The more recent literature has found that consumers 
have significant demand for fuel economy, although whether consumers treat a change in 
discounted fuel costs equivalently to a change in the vehicle price remains an open question 
(Allcott and Wozny, 2009; Busse et al., 2009; and Bento et al., 2010). In comparison to the focus 
on consumer demand, there has been very little recent analysis of the cost of raising fuel 
economy. 
4.3 Analysis of CAFE II 
Only a few existing studies have assessed the effects of the upcoming changes to CAFE. 
Knittel (2009) focuses on the technical feasibility of meeting CAFE II. Using historical model-
level data on vehicle characteristics since 1980, the paper reports the estimated technical 
tradeoffs between power, weight and fuel economy. A 10 percent weight reduction (300 pounds 
for a typical car) would raise fuel economy by roughly 4 percent (1 mpg). The elasticity of fuel 
economy with respect to horsepower or torque is about -3 (the results differ for cars and light 
trucks). This suggests that it is technically feasible to meet the new CAFE standards, yet the 
actual power and weight increases observed in the market since 1980 would be reduced by 25 Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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percent (see Figure 2). The conclusion that the standards are technically feasible using existing 
technology is consistent with the rulemaking analysis by EPA and NHTSA for CAFE II (U.S. 
EPA and NHTSA 2010b). However, the EPA and NHTSA analysis precludes a reduction in 
vehicle performance and focuses instead on changes manufacturers already use that raise fuel 
economy without reducing performance. Thus, although the studies similarly conclude that the 
upcoming standards will not require innovation, it is an open question as to which of the 
available strategies manufacturers will use most widely. 
In addition to significantly raising the standards, the upcoming regulation also introduces 
credit trading. Austin and Dinan (2005) allow for credit trading but assume perfect competition 
in the credit market. Rubin et al. (2009) investigate the effects of imperfect competition in the 
credit market on the overall costs of CAFE. The paper uses a simplified structure of the vehicle 
market, but it models the credit market as an oligopoly with a competitive, price-taking fringe. 
Firms can generate excess credits by increasing the fuel economy of their vehicles. The authors 
find a Nash equilibrium in which each oligopolist chooses the profit-maximizing fuel economy 
of its vehicles, given the fuel economy of other vehicles in the market and the behavior of firms 
in the fringe. The authors obtain numerical solutions based on estimated costs and consumer 
valuation of an increase in fuel economy. The paper concludes that allowing credit trading 
reduces the cost of CAFE by 7–16 percent. The estimated cost is similar whether the credit 
market is modeled as perfectly or imperfectly competitive. 
5. Conclusions 
The economics literature on CAFE has focused on firms’ pricing decisions, and, more 
recently, on the firms’ choices of vehicle characteristics. Because of the interest in comparing the 
cost-effectiveness of CAFE with other policies, the literature has focused on incorporating the 
new vehicle market into a model that includes households’ decisions regarding vehicle scrappage 
and purchases, as well as vehicle miles travelled. Because this analysis includes other markets 
besides new vehicles, it is necessary for computational reasons to aggregate vehicle models to 
the market-segment level and to limit the variables that firms can choose. Only recently has 
research focused more on the treatment of the new vehicles market itself. 
Comparing estimates across studies is not straightforward, but studies that incorporate 
more margins along which firms can respond to fuel economy regulations tend to estimate lower 
compliance costs. However, these studies consider relatively small increases in the CAFE 
standards, on the order of 1–3 mpg. Furthermore, they have not yet incorporated many of the 
new features of CAFE II. Thus, they provide some insight into the likely effects of the new Resources for the Future  Klier and Linn 
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regulation, but considerable work will be needed to develop a model that captures the most 
important margins along which firms could respond, including changing vehicle characteristics 
and adopting new technology, as well as the new features of CAFE II. 
By comparison, the rulemaking analysis by EPA and NHTSA focuses on technical 
aspects of the market, with a much more sophisticated treatment of vehicle technology than in 
the economics literature. The rulemaking analysis includes only a limited treatment of pricing 
behavior, however, and it does not model competitive interactions among firms. There is also 
disagreement over the appropriate parameter values relating to the cost and demand for fuel 
economy. Consequently, our understanding of CAFE II has the following significant gaps: 
 
a)  Firms may introduce new vehicle technologies over the next several years, but how consumers 
value these technologies is unclear. Far more attention should be devoted to estimating the cost of 
raising fuel economy in the medium and long run. 
b)  Some dynamic supply side decisions—including entry and exit of vehicle models, technology, 
learning, and uncertainty—have not been modeled in an economic framework. Linkages between 
the new and used vehicle markets could also receive greater study. 
c)  Dynamics of new vehicle purchases should be included. For example, if the CAFE standards are 
expected to increase, consumers who prefer large vehicles may purchase these vehicles before the 
increase occurs. 
d)  Whether interactions may occur between the product market and the CAFE credit market is 
unknown. 
e)  Generally, the footprint-based approach in CAFE II has not been incorporated into new vehicle 
market models.  
The EPA has announced plans to raise CAFE standards further between 2017 and 2025, 
making these issues even more salient. Thus, the major increases in stringency and the changes 
in the structure of CAFE create a need for research that incorporates the demand and supply 
sides of the new vehicle market in a more detailed manner than was needed with static fuel 
economy standards, typical of CAFE I. 
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Tables and Figures 
See following pages. Authors Demand framework Supply framework Policy evaluation Policy conclusions
Greene 
(1991)
Multinomial logit choice 
model across individual car 
model-engine combinations.
Producers incur all costs.
Estimates cost of raising fuel 
economy by changing vehicle 
prices.
Increasing fuel economy by 1 




Vehicle ownership and usage 
jointly determined. Nested 
logit structure with new 
vehicle products 
differentiated by market 
segment, manufacturer, and 
domestic status.
Oligopoly: firms choose 
vehicle prices and domestic 
shares. Distinguishes 
between firms that exceed 
standard and firms that pay 
fine.
Estimates effect on gasoline 
consumption of eliminating 
CAFE or raising gasoline tax.
Eliminating CAFE has same 
effect on gasoline 
consumption as raising 




Vehicle ownership and usage 
jointly determined. Random 
coefficients logit demand with 
new vehicle products 
differentiated by 
manufacturer and market 
segment. 
Oligopoly: firms choose 
vehicle prices. New vehicle 
market linked to competitive 
used vehicle market. Adds 
constrained category of firms 
to Goldberg (1998).
Compares 1 mpg increase in 
CAFE with increase in 
gasoline tax.
CAFE costs ~$20 billion per 
year; about six times higher 
than gasoline tax.
Table 1
Comparison of CAFE Studies
Panel A: Exogenous Fuel EconomyAuthors Demand framework Supply framework Policy evaluation Policy conclusions
Kleit 
(2004)
Price elasticities estimated 
from industry data. New 
vehicle products 
differentiated by 
manufacturer and market 
segment.
Perfect competition.
Compares 3 mpg increase in 
CAFE with increase in 
gasoline tax that reduces 
gasoline consumption by 
same amount.
Total cost of CAFE to new 
vehicle market: $2 billion per 
year (1999 dollars); 14 times 
more expensive, per gallon 




Same demand structure as 
Kleit.
Oligopoly: firms choose 
prices and fuel economy.
Similar to Kleit, comparing 
3.8 mpg increase in CAFE 
with increase in gasoline tax.
Total cost of CAFE: $3.6 
billion per year (without 
trading); three times more 
costly than gasoline tax.
Shiau et 
al. (2009)
Random coefficients logit 
model with new vehicle 
products differentiated by 
model.
Single-product oligopolist 
chooses price and vehicle 
design.
Considers effect on vehicle 
price and design for different 
levels of CAFE standard.
CAFE not binding at current 
level; firms raise fuel 
economy at intermediate 





Nested logit structure with 
new vehicle products 
differentiated by model.
Oligopoly: firms choose 
prices, fuel economy, weight, 
and power.
Estimates cost of 1 mpg 
increase in standards.





Firms can use flexible fuel 
credits to comply with 
standards. Marginal cost of 
alternative compliance 
options equals marginal cost 
of credits.
Estimates marginal cost of 
CAFE to producers.
 
Marginal cost of $8–$18 per 
vehicle (total cost to 
producers less than $300 
million per year).
Panel B: Endogenous Fuel Economy
Notes: Each row describes a paper that is discussed in the text. The first column outlines the demand side of the model, and the second 
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Figure 4: Fuel Economy Standard versus Footprint for Cars 
in 2016
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Notes: Figure is constructed from U.S. EPA and NHTSA (2010).